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Abstract 
This paper is part of a research agenda outlined in Franck et al. (2016) directed toward improving 
the realism of defense acquisition schedules. Defense acquisition schedules have long been a 
difficult problem. In this particular effort, we consider primarily the case of the 737MAX, which has 
been a fortuitous example of the risks of scheduling-by-fiat. We analyze the 737MAX 
misadventure using Systems Dynamic and Root Cause Analysis methods. 
Introduction 
Interest in project management estimations—cost and scheduling—remains strong in 
the academic world, driven by the sometimes-spectacular cost and schedule overruns in 
general, but defense projects in particular. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the effort, projects 
continue to fail and overrun every established metric. Nevertheless, we continue to study in the 
hopes of a breakthrough—a cure—for all that ails the defense acquisition world.  
No one believes it is possible to accurately estimate a schedule so there are no 
overruns. Sometimes we get scheduling right, but often we get it wrong. After the fact, we can 
determine what went wrong and why; however, we have not yet been able to prevent failure. 
However, we believe we must do better not only to stay on schedule, but to answer the 
overriding imperative in defense acquisition to deliver systems as fast as possible that work. 
There are many hypotheses about the why, but it could be we are ignoring the one constant 
factor in project management: the human being with all the complexity and imperfections. 
Humans tend to think about project management in the context of cause and effect 
(Dörner, 1996). We consider cost and associated variables during the project planning process. 
We do the same when developing a schedule. The planning process allows us to visualize how 
the development will unfold. Once we start executing, however, our ability to visualize the 
interplay of variables, from stakeholder demands to supply chain issues to requirements 
changes, is limited. We then react to events in a serial “cause and effect manner,” solving the 
immediate problem, but often neglecting to consider feedback and second order effects of those 
decisions. Newton’s Third Law of Motion states, “For every action, there is an equal and 
opposite reaction.” In human activities from engineering to war, a corollary to that law adds the 
idea of a counteraction, or response to the reaction. This concept is well understood in military 
planning and is a basic concept in wargaming, but in planning for and managing projects we 
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identify the cause and effect relationships, action-reaction, but don’t consider the action-
reaction-counteraction sequence.  
Scheduling is unique as studies by operational research experts, systems analysts, and 
even mathematicians attest (Boyd & Mundt, 1995; Herroelen & Leus, 2004, 2005; Rodrigues & 
Williams, 1998; Vandevoorde & Vanhoucke, 2006). In fact, we can explain schedule—the how 
and the what—using mathematics. We can also use the same mathematics and probability to 
develop schedules. What we haven’t been able to do is apply mathematics and probability to 
get scheduling right. System dynamics provides the opportunity to consider scheduling and 
schedule execution from the people perspective. 
System dynamics was conceived and developed by Forrester in the 1960s (Forrester, 
1971). In many ways, Forrester’s approach was like that of Dörner in that both recognized not 
only the limitations in human ability, but also that social systems were far more complex and 
difficult to understand than any technology. Further, both saw the world in terms of systems. 
Although we may not always think of it, we treat a development project, whether commercial or 
military, as a system with both inputs and outputs, as well as constraints and mechanisms. 
Inputs represent those management, budget, policy, materials, and other variables that are 
transformed by the system into outputs. Constraints are those regulatory, legal, fiscal, and time 
variables that restrict the system. Mechanisms are the people and processes used by the 
system to transform to the outputs. 
If a project plan is a mental model of a system development, it represents the project 
team’s shared assumptions of how the development will proceed. It represents a system 
structure (Forrester, 1971). Forrester also recognized that the human mental model (including 
that of a system development) often fails because the human mind often draws the wrong 
conclusions about the consequences of that model. System dynamics thinking and a recognition 
of the criticality in considering the role and thinking of the human in project management in 
general and scheduling in particular offers a tool to examine the execution of aerospace system 
developments. 
The Boeing 737MAX: Background  
The reader is entitled to ask why a commercial project, like the 737MAX, is a legitimate 
topic for defense acquisition research. We believe the answer is in the three parts. First, the 
Boeing airliner is an aerospace program with technical, program management, and scheduling 
issues. Second, the 737MAX program (particularly the aircraft accidents) have been highly 
publicized. This public discussion has produced a fairly extensive airing of the relevant facts, 
and also some excellent analyses (which make research in some depth both possible and 
potentially illuminating). Finally, the 737MAX is a superb example of what can happen when 
program duration is dictated by considerations outside the development program.1 
The Boeing Corporation and Airbus SE, a duopoly, are the largest commercial and 
defense aircraft producers in the world. Boeing’s first successful commercial jet was the Boeing 
707 (first flight 1957). Airbus became a major commercial aircraft player with the A320 (the 
major Boeing 737 competitor) in 1987. In a very real sense, the Boeing 737MAX was a product 
of the Boeing-Airbus competition. Boeing has been continuously incorporated (albeit under 
different names) since 1916; Airbus since 1970. 
 
1 This is what we term an “aspirational” schedule estimate, which we define more specifically later.  
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That rivalry has not been especially friendly. It has featured World Trade Organization 
complaints2 and some hard-fought contests in various market segments. These have included 
aerial tankers (Boeing KC-46 vs. NG/Airbus A330 MRTT). However, the center of their 
competition has been narrow-body civil airliners—the contenders being the Airbus A320 and 
Boeing 737 families. Both have been major commercial successes and significant contributors 
to both companies’ profits. Deliveries by year are shown in Figure 1. While the competition has 
been intense, both companies have been highly successful in the narrow-body market—so far.  
 
Figure 1. Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 deliveries by year (since A320 first flight) 
 
By 2010, Boeing had reason to believe the Boeing 737 was becoming obsolescent, and 
was considering a new, clean-sheet replacement aircraft. The most promising enhancements 
then available were new turbofans, but they offered fuel efficiency improvements that were likely 
in single-digit percentages, certainly no more than 15% (Aviation Week, 2010). Boeing 
management reckoned that prospective customers would not be sufficiently interested in 
recapitalizing their fleets to purchase airplanes of this sort. 
Thus, the near future for the narrow-body competition likely featured continued 
production of essentially the same aircraft (Boeing’s 737NG) and the most recent versions of 
the Airbus 320 family. The next generation of narrow-body passenger airliners would appear 
around 2020. 
At the time, that position was plausible, but proved to be wrong. New engines available 
(CFM International Leap 1B and the Pratt & Whitney PW 1000G) offered fuel efficiency 
increases of about 14%, and customers were indeed interested in the fuel efficiencies the 
A320neo (new engine option) offered. At the Paris Air Show of 2011, Airbus presold 667 
A320neos in one week. This, and related developments, convinced Boeing of a time-sensitive 
need to respond to the re-engined Airbus models. In response, Boeing promised in 2011 to 
deliver a narrow body fairly quickly (Gelles et al., 2019). 
Boeing entered development of a new narrow-body product (named the 737MAX) at a 
double disadvantage. First, Airbus had started its program sooner. Second, the Airbus 320 (first 
flight in 1987) was a newer design than the Boeing 737 (1967). In particular, it had more vertical 
distance between the (wing) engine mounts and the tarmac. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
2 This dispute has surfaced again recently, with U.S. threats to impose tariffs on EU goods because of a WTO finding of 
illegal subsidies for Airbus (Peker & Zumbrun, 2019). One previous chapter in this long-running story is recounted in 
Franck et al. (2011, pp. 8–9). 
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Basically, Boeing found itself in the position of having to produce a new narrow-body 
airliner that would be ready (soon enough) close to the A320neo launch with fuel efficiency 
improvements that were sizeable (good enough) to cause customers to remain with Boeing 
rather than moving to Airbus. Airbus was going to have the A320neo available by 2017, with 
12–15% improvement in fuel efficiency (relative to the A320). Boeing’s response was to promise 
quick delivery of a new model 737 with a new fuel-efficient engine.  
 
 
Figure 2. Engine ground clearance on A320 family vs. Boeing 737 family (bing.com/images) 
 
In summary, the logic that appears to have driven the Boeing 737MAX strategy is as follows: 
• Competitive pressure from Airbus for single-aisle aircraft forced Boeing to do 
something quickly in order to remain in that line of business. 
• Fuel efficient engines are necessary to sell passenger jets in the current global 
market. They were also necessary to tempt airline customers to buy new aircraft. 
• The schedule would be driven by the perceived need for an in-service time as close 
to the Airbus A320 neo as possible. 
• The schedule, over cost and performance, seems to have been Boeing 
management’s driving factors, rather than being driven by the time required for the 
necessary engineering.  
• Use of 737 airframe meant lower production costs, simpler FAA certification, and 
lower training costs (driven by pilot familiarity with existing 737 fleet). 
• Larger engines did not fit on the existing 737 wings, so design modifications were 
needed. 
• Engine modifications changed the aerodynamics of the airplane.  
• However, the airplane needed to match the pilot qualification requirements of in-
service B737 aircraft so that aircrew training did not significantly delay introduction to 
commercial service. (This last constraint proved to be particularly consequential.)3  
It appears the modifications to this aircraft originally designed in the late 1960s to make 
it a competitor in the 2010s were greater than originally anticipated. Relocated, more powerful 
engines significantly changed the aircraft handling characteristics in some flight regimes. Any 
new requirements resulting from the changes probably should have driven new requirements 
 
3 This would mean that the 737NG and 737MAX would carry the same “type rating” and pilots could be qualified to 
fly both. Campbell (2019) explains all this succinctly and well. 
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which would have increased the schedule an unacceptable amount of time. This management 
reaction to competitive pressure seems a classic case of what we call an aspirational schedule. 
Figure 3 shows a system view of the 737 upgrade. The arrows show the interrelationship of the 
system variables, as well as the feedback those variables can cause.  
 
Figure 3. The 737 Upgrade “System” 
 
The Race to the Swift 
Completing development of the Boeing aircraft to the Airbus timeline was a schedule 
challenge, as shown in Table 1. The major program objective was to deliver a more fuel-efficient 
narrow-body airliner quickly and at a relatively low cost before the market was saturated by 
Airbus.  
The new engine was larger in diameter than those on current 737s.4 This difficulty was 
overcome by modifying the nose landing gear and positioning the new engine forward and 
upward relative to the wing. The overall effect was to keep the same ground clearance while 
taxiing. However, moving the engines changed the flight characteristics of the aircraft.  
Table 1. Major Milestones (Actual) for the Airbus A320neo and Boeing 737MAX 
EVENT A320 neo 737MAX 
Program Announced December 2010 August 2011 
First Aircraft Produced July 2014 December 2015 
First Flight September 2014 January 2016 
First Customer Delivery January 2016 May 2017 
 
4 The 737 was well designed for a low-bypass turbofan, like the JT8 (48” in diameter). A high-bypass turbofan like the 
CFM-56 (60”) necessitated an oval cowling to preserve ground clearance. An advanced high-bypass turbofan like the 
LEAP 1-B (69”) also necessitated repositioning the engine for the 737MAX family. 
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Schedule Pressure: Speedy Execution 
The schedule pressure had technical ramifications, but also impacted the work 
environment. According to several published reports (e.g., Broderick, 2019; Gelles et al., 2019; 
Nicas et al., 2019), the 737MAX development program proceeded on something of a forced 
march schedule. Boeing employees perceived a compelling need to finish within the company’s 
time frame.  
In search of faster progress, an approach described as “compartmentalized” came into 
being.5 (This, of course, raises the question whether this approach contributed to the 
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System [MCAS] problems that arose later.) Some 
concluded in retrospect that the development schedule had been “stretched to the breaking 
point” (e.g., Campbell, 2019). 
The Problematic Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System  
Scientists and engineers seem able to predict only a fraction of the difficulty 
they are likely to face in a specific project. Much of it simply crops up 
unexpectedly. (McNaugher, 1987, p. 66) 
In fact, even programs intended to be simple can have complications, and the 737MAX 
was deceptively complicated. The A320neo is mostly a re-engined A320. The new 737MAX 
required more complex modifications to reduce drag and a need to reposition the engines. The 
new engines (LEAP 1B) were almost 40% larger and weighed almost double those of the 
737NG (CFM-56). The new plane was longer and had a wider wingspan. What Boeing couldn’t 
change was the height above airport ramps without having to redesign the landing gear, which 
would have threatened both the development schedule and quick FAA certification (Tkacik, 
2019).  
A later part of the testing program revealed the aircraft tended to pitch up, because the 
Center of Gravity (CG) and the Center of Lift (CL) were too close together due to the new 
engine location (Coughlin, 2020). The change in engine position is shown in Figure 2.  
Acknowledging the challenges with the engine repositioning, one proposed solution 
involved modifications to the airframe itself (Langewiesche, 2019). However, given the schedule 
pressure, Boeing chose instead a software solution.6 It was named the Maneuvering 
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS; Gelles, 2019; Broderick, 2019). The first version 
of MCAS (MCAS17) was intended to input automatic, corrective control inputs to situations 
involving relatively high airspeeds (and G forces, in the form of 0.6 degrees of pitch-down trim 
applied in 10 seconds, with maximum trim change limited to 5 degrees; Gates, 2019).  
However, later flight tests also revealed some difficulties at normal G forces and low 
airspeed. This led to increased realm of engagement parameters to include low speeds, high 
angles of attack (AoAs) and “normal” G-loadings. MCAS pitch changes were increased to 2.5 
degrees (Campbell, 2019). Moreover, the resulting MCAS2 could engage any number of times 
(Gates, 2019; Langewiesche, 2019). The overall effect was to make the MCAS2 “more 
aggressive and riskier” (Nicas et al., 2019). 
 
5 This is analogous to problem decomposition in the operations research literature, and also bears resemblance to 
“concurrency” in the acquisition literature. 
6 There were, however, other reasons to favor a software solution. 
7 We term the earlier version as MCAS1 and the later (more aggressive version) as MCAS2. This is our own terminology 
and adopted for expository clarity. 
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From a software engineering perspective, Johnston et al. (2019) suggest there were four 
key errors in the development and fielding of MCAS: poor documentation, a rushed release, 
delayed software updates, and humans out of the loop. The poor documentation refers to not 
only the lack of documentation on MCAS, but that the documentation was printed instead of 
digital. MCAS1 was regarded (correctly, we think) as an “innocuous” feature that could or would 
seldom emerge as a problem. And, should it occur (in either version), treating the incident as a 
runaway-trim malfunction would solve the problem. Thus, the flight crews involved in the Lion 
and Ethiopian accidents had little, if any, knowledge of MCAS2 operation or potential 
consequences should an AoA indicator malfunction. According to Pastzor (2019): “One senior 
Boeing official said the company had decided against disclosing details about the system that it 
felt would inundate the average pilot with too much information—and significantly more 
technical data—than he or she needed or could realistically digest.” 
The rushed release was a product of the marketing driven strategy Boeing pursued—
release a product so as not to lose business (Johnston & Harris, 2019). Statements attributed to 
Boeing employees assigned to the project included “intense pressure cooker,” “fast turnaround” 
environment, and work at “double the normal rate.” One technician reported that he had 
received “sloppy blueprints” with a promise of future fixes. However, that remedy was still 
incomplete in early 2019 (Gelles et al., 2019). 
The delayed software updates were affected by some things Boeing could not control; 
the U.S. government shutdown in 2017 caused updates to be delayed by at least 4 months 
(Johnston & Harris, 2019; Pasztor, 2019). In at least one case, Boeing submitted a software fix 
to the FAA for certification 7 weeks before the Ethiopian Airlines crash. It is impossible to know 
whether a less rushed, more robust software design process would have made a difference 
(Johnston & Harris, 2019). 
The fourth issue, the “human out of the loop” problem, resulted from the MCAS2 being 
activated by a single AoA sensor (Nicas, 2019). Choosing to rely on one indicator when two 
were readily available could only be regarded as a “bewildering mistake” in retrospect 
(Langewiesche, 2019).8 A related mistake was allowing the more powerful MCAS2 to be 
activated an unlimited number of times. As Langewiesche (2019) noted, “No one I spoke to from 
Boeing, Airbus or the N.T.S.B. could explain the reasoning here.” 
It is clear in hindsight that Boeing’s haste led to mistakes or miscommunications. Those 
out of the loop were not limited to pilots. For example, relevant FAA officials were not informed 
(Gates, 2019); discussion of the MCAS system was deleted from the 737MAX pilot manual 
(Tangel, 2019); and furthermore, the more aggressive version, MCAS2, was not well shared 
with interested parties, including airworthiness certification authorities (Tangel, 2019). 
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Figure 4. How the B737Max Came to Be 
Our summary of the 737Max story is shown in Figure 4. The key drivers were time 
perceptions based on the market rather than engineering estimates. It’s worth noting that getting 
to “MCAS decisions” include both technical and communications issues (especially not fully 
informing the pilots). Figure 5 shows our assessment of the dynamics of the development.  
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THE 737MAX CRASHES 
 
Figure 6. Hypothesized Causes of 737MAX Mishaps. 
(Langewiesche, 2019; Pasztor, 2019; authors’ interpretations) 
The circumstances of the Lion and Ethiopian Air accidents with the 737MAX have been 
discussed extensively. For those interested in learning more about the events surrounding the 
crashes, we recommend Langewiesche (2019) and Tangel et al. (2019) as good starting points. 
In addition, reports by various agencies (e.g., House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2020; JTAR, 2019; NTSB, 2019) are very informative. 
Overall Comments on This Case 
1. What trades were made? 
• Schedule got major (close to exclusive) emphasis—with attendant design 
constraints. Strict (at least fairly strict) adherence to original schedule was 
pervasively enforced. 
2. Consequences of the trades (results of schedule emphasis)? 
• A new narrow-body type was conclusively ruled out; schedule constraint dictated 
a 737 variant with a new, but already developed model. 
• In development there was a lack of overall program review and oversight. 
• In at least some cases, multiple concurrent tasks were completed with insufficient 
regard for overall aircraft safety. (Nothing apparently went wrong with 
“performance” or apparently with cost.) 
• Time pressures throughout the 737MAX development effort. 
• Some steps were skipped. 
• Some steps were done concurrently. 
• Most notable specific example of unknown work (ex-ante) is that a bigger engine 
on old airframe design resulted in pitch-up problems noted at low speeds and 
high angles of attack. 
• Although not intended, the program pace detracted from the operating safety of 
the airplane delivered for commercial service. 
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3. How and why were the trades made? 
• Schedule emphasis due primarily to commercial success of A320neo, which put 
Boeing at a major strategic disadvantage in the narrow-body airliner market. 
• Recovery strategy focused on a quickly developed 737 variant. 
4. What is the evidence or rework? Primarily responding to the pitch-up problem:  
• MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, part of 737MAX 
software suite) was changed to deal with aircraft handling issues in high-speed 
flight.  
• Further rework arose with the need to resolve pitch-up problems at low speed 
with high power settings. A solution (MCAS2) appeared late in the game (within 
the corporate-dictated schedule). Good information on this issue (both quality 
and quantity) is available in publicly available sources. 
Some Further Observations 
An interesting, but so far somewhat neglected, question was how Boeing was caught 
wrong-footed in 2011 with the Airbus 320neo underway, with no planned response until 2020. 
One report (Broderick, 2019) has it that the A320neo family was originally intended as a 
defensive response to the potential threat from Bombardier’s Canadian Regional Jets.9  
If that is indeed the case, then why did Boeing not feel a similar need to likewise defend 
itself? For Boeing, like Airbus, the narrow-body airliner family is its leading source of profit. How 
did Boeing look at the same market environment (with the same contestability concerns) and 
reach a very different conclusion—especially when the B737 design was closer to the end of a 
long run than was the A320. The bottom line might well be that the fundamental root cause of 
the current 737MAX difficulties was a strategic miscalculation a decade in the past. 
As noted, this miscalculation led to a difficult problem for Boeing in two parts: (1) coaxing 
additional competitive life from a half-century-old design, and (2) doing so in a manner 
responsive to the threat posed by the Airbus A320neo. This first part was due primarily to an old 
design originally intended for low-bypass turbofans. The second part would have been less 
difficult had Boeing not made the strategic miscalculation noted previously and had started its 
737-replacement program sooner. 
In short, Boeing launched a program which (like all new programs) had both competitive 
and technical aspects. In this case, a timely response to the A320neo dictated the form (re-
engining) of its narrow-body program at a pace driven by the A320neo family. The MCAS 
consequences were partly a matter of bad luck, but the design team might well have made other 
miscalculations for which the consequences have been nonexistent or less serious. 
Finally, and most relevant to our current purpose, is that the 737MAX case is an object 
lesson concerning the hazards of aspirational schedules, especially if they’re taken too 
seriously.  
 
9 This seems unlikely at first glance but is understandable. For example, Franck et al. (2012) contains an analysis of 
various potential competitors to the Boeing-Airbus narrow-body duopoly – of which Bombardier and Embraer 
regional jets were reckoned the most serious. This hypothesis is supported, inter alia, by Airbus acquiring the 
Canadian Regional Jet production facilities, and Embraer’s regional jets now being a joint venture with Boeing 
(which holds an eighty-percent interest). 
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A Final Word—Aspirational Schedules 
While this study examined a commercial aircraft project, the similarities of complex 
system development are strikingly like the broader aerospace and defense (A&D) sector. 
Indeed, Boeing is both commercial aircraft manufacturer and defense contractor. We posit the 
aerospace-defense world practices two inherently different kinds of system development 
scheduling. There are two kinds of scheduling. The first is based on a structured planning (e.g., 
Critical Path Method [CPM] or Program Review Evaluation Technique [PERT]). The second kind 
of scheduling is that described in this paper—aspirational scheduling. We define an aspirational 
schedule as one defined by a political or business desire, aim, or goal rather than accepted 
scheduling techniques.  
Aspirational schedules are driven by political and commercial processes and decisions. 
It is an example of making engineering development fit a strategy, rather than allowing the 
engineering discipline to define the time needed. In and of itself, the idea of political or 
commercial events driving developments is not new. Developments from the Manhattan Project 
to the Lockheed U-2 to Polaris are examples of political requirements driving development. 
What may be lacking in this latest move to aspirational schedules, however, is 
acknowledgement of the challenges of aspirational scheduling and an acceptance of the 
necessity for reasoned trades in a development.  
Aspirational schedules now appear to be highly fashionable, and they have also 
attracted powerful institutional advocates. One recent example is the Air Force’s Digital Century 
Series initiative. Its chief advocate is the current Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, Will Roper. He advocates rapid development and production of a series of fighter 
aircraft, such as the Air Force procured starting in the 1950s. His rationale includes a more agile 
response to peer competitors, enabled by new generations of design simulation software 
(Freedburg, 2019). This is to take place in a less risk-averse acquisition culture. With these 
technologies and development of new combat aircraft types in 5 years or less, this looks a lot 
like a large-scale adoption of aspirational schedules (Insinna, 2019).  
A second example emerging is the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (Minuteman ICBM 
replacement). The program has been declared “late to need,” and is proceeding apace despite 
potential complications with an ongoing Federal Trade Commission investigation (Censer, 2019; 
Clark, 2019; Erwin, 2018; FTC, 2018).  
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